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We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed 
over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite 
number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed 
about the true state of the world. When n = 1, full information revelation never occurs in 
equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. With n > 1 the 
outcome depends both on the structure of the sellers’ information and, even more importantly, 
on the intensity of competition allowed by the trading rules. When there is intense 
competition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to the 
buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough, regardless of the number of informed sellers. 
On the other hand, for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms of 
competition (presence of clienteles), for any n we always have equilibria where information is 
never fully revealed. Moreover, in that case, when only one seller is informed, for many 
parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation, even for 
large n. 
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This paper studies a strategic model of dynamic trading where: (1) non-negligible
agents interact with negligible ones —a ﬁnite number of sellers serve a continuum of
buyers, and (2) there is asymmetric information about the quality of the good be-
ing traded, an instance of common values uncertainty. All buyers are uninformed,
while at least some sellers are informed.1 In this situation the “size”, or the mar-
ket power of a seller is determined along two dimensions: his market share, as in
standard oligopoly, and his informational status, i.e., whether he is informed or
not. Furthermore, trade extends potentially over inﬁnitely-many periods; hence,
current actions may have important eﬀects on a trader’s “size” in the future.
When no trader has any appreciable market power, the most often used equi-
librium notion in economies with common values asymmetric information is given
by the rational expectations equilibrium (REE).2 Like Walrasian equilibria, REE
do not rely on a speciﬁc trading mechanism (in this sense we can say they are
institution-free), but simply on a price function specifying a price in each state,
taken as given by all traders. The economy is “competitive”, although not exactly
in a standard sense. The observation of a realized price from the equilibrium price
function not only deﬁnes the agents’ trading possibilities in that state, but also ag-
gregates and disseminates information, allowing uninformed traders to learn about
the true state. In fact, REE prices generically fully reveal all the agents’ private
information, without any delay. Not specifying the trading rules is no doubt an
advantage in terms of robustness, but the “black box” feature of the price func-
tion leaves open an important question: how does the private information held by
some traders get incorporated into the REE price function?
To address this question, it is imperat i v et oi n v e s t i g a t et h es t r a t e g i cf o u n -
dations of REE. This requires the speciﬁcation of trading procedures where the
transmission of information among the agents in the market is explicitly modelled.
This issue has already received some attention in the literature, primarily within
the set-up of static models, and of other trading mechanisms, like auctions or
market games, where it was shown that the non-exclusivity of traders’ informa-
tion plays an important role in determining whether convergence to REE obtains
when the number of traders increases.3
1Having no information on the buyers’ side is a simplifying assumption, though in line with
the oligopolistic literature treating all consumers symmetrically.
2See Radner (1982) for a survey.
3See Section 7 for further details on the related literature.
2Rather than on the information structure, this paper will focus on the proper-
ties of the trading mechanism that may facilitate or hinder revelation. In particu-
lar we identify two such properties: the transparency of the market (i.e. the extent
to which market prices are observable and information over trades is disclosed to
other traders), and the degree of competition allowed by the trading rules (i.e.
t h ee a s ew i t hw h i c hb u y e r sa r ef r e e ,a ta n yp o i n ti nt i m e ,t oc h o o s ew h o mt ob u y
from).
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h e s ef a c t o r ss t e m sf r om considering the negative results on
convergence and information revelation obtained by Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin
and Serrano (2001) among others, which are independent of the information struc-
ture. These authors consider economies with inﬁnitely many trading dates where
each period agents chosen from a continuum are randomly matched in pairs and
within each pair they bargain over the terms of trade (rejection of all oﬀers and
hence refusal to trade is always possible). In this set-up it is found that even
with a continuum of traders, many of them informed (hence with no exclusivity
of information), and in the limit as discounting goes to zero,4 a sizeable portion of
uninformed traders tran s a c ta tp r i c e st h a ta r eex post not individually rational.
In the trading mechanism considered in these pairwise meetings papers both
the degree of transparency of the market and the degree of competition are fairly
limited:
(A) No transparency: agents have no access to any public market signals/prices,
nor do they have any information over the terms at which trade occurred in
the past in the market (each trader observes and remembers only his own
history of trades).
(B) Local monopoly: each pairwise meeting (which can be thought of as a buyer
visiting a particular store) represents a “local monopoly” in its own right,
in the sense that in that period the buyer can buy the good only from
that store. Of course, he can walk out and visit a diﬀerent store, but this
comes at a cost, as captured by discounting. Likewise, a seller cannot get
instantaneous, discrete increases in his market share because of the face-to-
face trading interaction.
In this light, one criticism of the pairwise meetings papers is that they have
gone too far in limiting the possibilities of information transmission among traders.
4Discounting is the cost of acquiring information through price sampling.
3It is in fact plausible to model a situation in which traders receive some market
signal. In this paper we shall assume that each period buyers get to observe all
prices posted by sellers before they agree to buy the good — high transparency.5
Still, as our results will show, even if one removes friction (A) by having full
observability of prices, restrictions to competition similar to (B) may suﬃce to
prevent information revelation.
Our approach to better understand the mechanisms behind information reve-
lation will be to develop models that “lie between”the pairwise meetings market
and REE. Accordingly, we shall analyze variants of a model with several com-
petition rules and information structures, to identify the conditions under which
i n f o r m a t i o nr e v e l a t i o no c c u r s . I ne a c hc ase, we will provide a complete charac-
terization of equilibria and analyze their revelation and eﬃciency properties. The
speciﬁcs of our model follow.
We study a market for an indivisible good of uncertain quality with inﬁnitely
many trading dates. All the units of the good in each period are of the same
quality, either high or low. Thus, there are two states of the world: H and L.
There is a continuum of buyers, all of them uninformed about the state. Among
the ﬁnite number n of sellers, at least one is informed. Every period, each seller
simultaneously chooses whether to post a high or a low price for the good.6 Upon
observing the prices posted in a period, every buyer can either refuse to buy, and
be present again in the market the next period, or accept to buy from one of the
sellers at the price he posted, and leave the market.
As a building block in our analysis, we consider ﬁrst the case of an informed
monopolist (n =1 ). We ﬁnd that at equilibrium information revelation is minimal.
He reveals some information only when the buyers’ prior belief is too pessimistic
about the state being H; in this case he reveals only part of his information
and only in the ﬁrst period. Thus continued randomization is not optimal: once
the buyers are convinced that consuming the good brings them a non-negative
expected utility, the single informed trader has no further incentive to reveal his
information. The presence of competitors among the sellers will change this result
ag r e a td e a l .
5See Peters (1991) for a related model, where agents’ matching is non-random because it is
aﬀected by the posted prices.
6The restriction of having only two possible prices strips down the model of unnecessary
complications (in particular, by limiting the role of the beliefs of the uninformed) and allows to
provide a complete characterization of all the equilibrium outcomes. As argued in Appendix B,
the substance of our results remains valid even if this restriction is dropped.
4The paper proceeds to analyze the case of oligopoly under two extreme infor-
mation structures: (i) all sellers are informed: information is thus non-exclusive
and each seller is “informationally small” — see Gul and Postlewaite (1992); and
(ii) only one seller is informed: his “informational size ” is then large relative to the
other agents.7 More important qualitative diﬀerences are found in the equilibrium
outcomes corresponding to two alternative sets of trading rules, characterized by
diﬀerent intensities of price competiti o n .I nt h eﬁ r s to n e-d e n o t e da st h em o d e l
without clienteles - each buyer is free to buy the good from the seller that is oﬀer-
ing it at the lowest price (as in the classic Bertrand model). On the other hand,
in the model with clienteles any seller can only reach within each period a fraction
of all buyers (resembling less extreme forms of competition, such as Cournot or
Bertrand with capacity constraints).
We show that in the model without clienteles, information is fully and imme-
diately revealed in every equilibrium for large enough n, no matter what is the
structure of the information. The intensity of price competition implies that the
beneﬁt of expanding one’s market share by posting a low price - in state L-i st o o
attractive, when the number of sellers is large enough, even though this means to
dissipate any current and future informational rent. This proves to be the case not
only with many informed sellers, for whom “collusion”to hide their information is
fragile and does not survive when n is large enough, but also when there is just
one informed seller, who prefers to give up his exclusive information in order to
increase his sales.
The situation is rather diﬀerent in the model with clienteles. Although when
all sellers are informed there is again an equilibrium with full revelation because of
the non-exclusivity of information, a collusive equilibrium where some information
is not revealed at any date exists as well, whatever the number of sellers. Moreover,
when only one seller is informed, for many parameter values there are no revealing
equilibria, even for arbitrarily large n.
The lack of information revelation in some equilibria of the model with clien-
teles resembles the one created by the “local monopoly” of the pairwise meetings
technology.8 Our results show that even allowing full transparency (removing fric-
7Our main qualitative results extend to the case of less extreme information structures,
because the relevant incentive constraints are essentially the same.
8Note that the face-to-face restriction of the pairwise meetings trading technology can be
approximated as the limit of the restrictions to market share of the model with clienteles as
n →∞ . Of course, technically, the cardinality of the continuum of buyers is larger than the
limit of a sequence of a ﬁnite number of sellers, but the economic forces at work are well captured
by this heuristic argument.
5tion (A) above), a model that retains an element of friction (B) alone, such as the
clienteles, may yield that full revelation of information is not guaranteed. The
results also suggest that while both the non-exclusivity of the information and
intense competition among sellers encourage information revelation, the eﬀect of
the intensity of competition proves stronger than that of the non-exclusivity of
information: with clienteles we always have equilibria with no information rev-
elation, whether or not information is exclusive. These ﬁndings shed light on
some of the reasons behind strategic information revelation, and contribute to
our understanding of full revelation results as in REE. The reader may ﬁnd the
following diagram instructive, to appreciate how our models “ﬁt between”the two
paradigms that set out our discussion:























The economy. Agents are of two types: buyers and sellers. There are two
commodities, an indivisible consumption good, initially owned by the sellers, and
a perfectly divisible commodity (’money’), initially owned by the buyers. There is
a continuum of buyers, whose measure is normalized to 1. All buyers are identical:
each of them is willing to buy at most one unit of the consumption good. There
are n sellers, 1 ≤ n<∞, a n de a c ho ft h e mc a ns e l la na r b i t r a r i l yl a r g en u m b e ro f
units of the consumption good. Except possibly for their information, all sellers
are also identical.
6Trade takes place over time and there is uncertainty over the quality of the
indivisible good. Quality can be of two types, high (H)o rl o w( L), and all units
of the commodity in all periods are of the same quality. Uncertainty can thus be
described by two aggregate states of the world, H and L. The buyers’ valuation for
one unit of the commodity in the two states is, respectively, uH and uL. Similarly,
the sellers’ unit reservation value is cH in state H and cL in state L.T h e r e f o r e ,
the valuation of the commodity is perfectly correlated across agents; we are in a
situation of common values uncertainty. We assume that:
uH >c H >u L >c L ≥ 0.
Note that in each state there are positive gains from trade.
L e tu sd e n o t eb yα0 ∈ (0,1) the prior belief, common to all agents in the
economy, that the state of the world is H. In what follows, we will always assume
that buyers are uninformed over the realization of the state of the world; hence
their belief, when trading begins, is given by α0. On the other hand, we will allow
for diﬀerent cases with regard to the information held by sellers.
Trading rules. There are inﬁnitely many trading dates. At each t, t =1 ,. . . ,
each of the n sellers simultaneously posts a price at which he is willing to sell the
consumption good (to any number of buyers). After observing the n quoted prices,
each buyer chooses whether or not to trade in that period. If a buyer accepts an
o ﬀ e rm a d ei nt h ep e r i o d ,h eb u y so n eu n i ta tt h ep r o p o s e dp r i c ea n dt h e ne x i t st h e
market (we shall specify from which seller he buys in the next paragraph). If the
buyer rejects, he remains in the market and can then trade at some future date.
Sellers remain in the market until all buyers are served, which may never happen.
There are no new entrants in the market after the ﬁrst period. The quality of the
good becomes known to buyers only after they leave the market.
When there are several sellers (n>1), we shall distinguish two possible forms
of competition:
1. Model without clienteles. Each period t, following the announcement of the
prices posted by the n sellers, every buyer is free to trade with any of them.
In this situation sellers compete in prices, under no capacity constraints;
competition among sellers is then quite intense (as in the classical model of
Bertrand competition).
2. Model with clienteles. Each period t, a fraction of size 1/n of the buyers
who are still in the market is randomly assigned to every seller. In that pe-
riod each buyer can only buy from the seller he is assigned to. Since buyers
7observe all n posted prices, and always have the option to refuse to trade,
the temporary segmentation of the market introduced here does not elimi-
nate price competition among sellers. It only mitigates its intensity, since
undercutting prices has a less dramatic eﬀect on the demand for each seller
(resembling models of Cournot competition, or of Bertrand competition with
capacity constraints). Also, information leakages from an informed seller to
all uninformed traders are not prevented by the presence of clienteles.
Even though quite stylized, to ﬁx ideas one can think of the model as por-
traying situations like a speciﬁc wine crop sold in a fair by the producers, or the
market of derivatives on aggregate credi tr i s k . I nb o t hs i t u a tions we can argue
all units sold are of the same quality, buyers and sellers are clearly identiﬁed, and
there are reasons for trade other than diﬀerences in information. More generally,
one may view informational asymmetries in ﬁnancial markets as being typically
over common values uncertainty (e.g., over the asset returns). One can then think
of clienteles as buyers being inside the kiosk of a wine seller. In a given moment,
they can buy only from that seller, although information ﬂows across kiosks.
Both buyers and sellers evaluate payoﬀs from future trades according to the
common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). In this paper we are concerned with the limiting
results as n →∞rather than as δ → 1. However, all our results hold for any
δ<1 suﬃciently large. We should think in fact of trading dates as taking place
with a very high frequency; the reader is then invited to ﬁx δ at some arbitrarily
large value.
In most of the paper we focus our attention on the case where sellers can
propose only one of two given prices, a high price pH, cH <p H <u H,a n dal o w
price pL, cL <p L <u L.9 Note that all the fully revealing REE of the static version
of this economy would have a high price in state H and a low price in state L lying
in the corresponding intervals above. In addition, this parsimonious formulation
allows us to provide a complete characterization of all the equilibria of the trading
game, and to better focus on the issues concerning information revelation we are
primarily concerned with. In Appendix B we check for the robustness of our
ﬁndings, by showing that most of the qualitative properties we derive for the
equilibria remain valid also when sellers can choose from a continuum of prices.
Various cases with regard to the number of sellers in the economy and their
information will be considered. This will allow us to disentangle in the revelation
9We consider strict inequalities to rule out non-robust indiﬀerences.
8of information the role of market power given by the size of the sellers’ market
share from that given by their private information. In each case we characterize
the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the trading game described above. From now
on we refer to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium simply as an equilibrium.
As a benchmark case, we begin by analyzing the model with an informed
monopolist in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine the oligopoly without clienteles
a n di nS e c t i o n5t h eo n ew i t hc l i e n t e l e s .I n both cases, we analyze the properties
of the equilibria as the number of sellers gets large and perform our study under
the following two extreme information structures. First, one where all sellers
are informed. In this case, as n grows, sellers are both “informationally small”
and their market power as determined by their market share becomes negligible.
Second, we analyze the polar opposite case: there are several sellers, but only
one of them is informed (whose identity is common knowledge). Now, as n gets
large, this seller remains “informationally large”, while his market share decreases
(as that of all sellers), so that information is the only possible source of market
power. The welfare properties of the equilibria are discussed in Section 6. Since
the contribution of our paper lies in the comparison of results across models, not
to interfere with the presentation all proofs are gathered in Appendix A.
3. Monopoly
Consider the case where there is only one seller (n =1 ), who is fully informed of
the realization of the uncertainty.
The following observations will allow us to simplify the deﬁnition of an equi-
l i b r i u m .N o t eﬁ r s tt h a tw h e nt he seller observes state H (i.e., the seller is of ’type
H’) he will always propose pH at any trading date. Also, whenever a buyer is
proposed a price pL he will always accept, no matter what his belief is over the
realization of the uncertainty.
On the other hand, the ’type L’ seller faces a non-trivial choice between oﬀering
pH and pL; similarly the buyers, when they are proposed pH, have to decide
whether to accept or reject. In both cases we will allow for the possibility that the
agents may randomize in their choice. Let qS(t) denote the probability that the
seller in state L proposes pH at date t (given histories according to which in all
previous periods the seller always proposed pH and at least some buyers always
rejected; similarly, let qB(t) be the probability that a typical buyer accepts, at date
t, if the seller proposes pH, given histories in which the seller always proposed pH
9in the past.10 The payoﬀ of a buyer in a period where trade takes place, say at
price pH in state L, is uL −pH; for the seller it is then pH −cL times the fraction
of buyers accepting.
Each period t, after observing the price proposed by the seller, buyers will also
update their belief over the state of the world. If the seller proposes pL the buyers’
inference is irrelevant since, as already argued, their optimal action is always to
accept. Let αt denote the buyers’ belief at date t that the state of the world is H
if the seller proposed pH at t and in all past periods; such belief is updated every
period, using Bayes’ rule and taking into account the strategy of the type L seller:
αt =
αt−1
αt−1 +( 1− αt−1)qS(t)
for all t  1 (3.1)
Note that αt is always weakly increasing with t, and is strictly increasing as long
as qS(t) < 1.
An equilibrium of the trading game with an informed monopolist is then de-
scribed by the sequences {qB(t)}t≥1 , {qS(t)}t≥1 , {αt}t≥1 such that:
(i) {αt}t≥1 satisﬁes (3.1);
(ii) at each t, after every partial history in which not all buyers accepted the
seller’s oﬀer in one of the previous periods, {qB(τ)}τ≥t maximizes the buy-
ers’ discounted (to that date) payoﬀ, given {qS(τ),ατ}τ≥t , and {qS(τ)}τ≥t
maximizes the type L seller’s discounted payoﬀ, given {qB(τ)}τ≥t .
We will provide a complete characterization of the equilibria of this game. It
will be shown that we never have complete revelation of the seller’s information. In
particular, if the prior belief α0 that the true state of the world is H is suﬃciently
high, no information is ever revealed in the trading process: all equilibria exhibit
perfect pooling (of the two seller’s types) and no delay (all trades take place at
the initial date). On the other hand, if the buyers’ prior belief over H is not high
enough, some information gets always revealed in the ﬁrst trading date (as, with
10Additional equilibria can be found in which all buyers play pure strategies, and a proportion
qB(t) accepts the high price at date t, while the rest reject it. These equilibria are outcome
equivalent to the ones we study. This is the sense in which there is no loss of generality in
restricting attention to symmetric equilibria, as we shall do.
10some positive probability, the type L seller will propose a revealing price, pL).I n
this case, the monopolist will reveal the minimum amount of information needed
to induce buyers to be willing to trade at a high price. After that is accomplished,
no further information is ever revealed; we have so ’partial pooling’. In addition
there is delay: while pL is always immediately accepted by buyers, when pH is
proposed the buyers will reject, in all periods, with some positive probability.
Delay can even be inﬁnite.
Deﬁne ¯ α to be such that ¯ αuH +( 1− ¯ α)uL = pH.T h a ti s ,¯ α is the belief that
makes buyers exactly indiﬀerent between trading at pH with probability 1 and not
trading at all. Formally, we have the following:
Proposition 1. In the model with an informed monopolist the following equilib-
ria obtain:
(i) No information revelation:w h e n α0 ≥ ¯ α, in any equilibrium, we have
qS(t)=1for all t. In particular, if α0 > ¯ α, the equilibrium is unique with
qB(t)=1for every t. On the other hand, if α0 =¯ α, there are also equilibria where
qB(t) ∈ (0,1] for all t ≥ 1.
(ii) Partial and immediate revelation:w h e nα0 < ¯ α, in all equilibria, we have
qS(1) ∈ (0,1) so that α1 =¯ α, qS(t)=1for all t>1,q B(t) ∈ (0,1] for all t ≥ 1.
It is easy to see that the conﬁgurations we propose in the statement of Propo-
sition 1 are indeed equilibria of the model. Most of the argument in the proof is
devoted to show that no other behavior conforms with equilibrium. To gain some
intuition on the result, notice that in our setup the proﬁts a monopolist can get
from his private information and his market power lie in the possibility of manip-
ulating buyers’ beliefs and induce buyers to agree to trade at a high price, with
minimal delay. Our result shows that the seller will always succeed in generating
such beliefs, by revealing the minimal amount of information (possibly zero) which
is necessary, and all in the ﬁrst period. There is however a cost, given by the fact
that there may be (possibly considerable) delay in trade; the need for such cost
comes from the fact that the seller is otherw i s eu n w i l l i n gt oc h o o s et or e v e a lp a r t
of his information in equilibrium.
4. Oligopoly without Clienteles
In this section we examine the case where there are n>1 sellers, who compete
in prices among them, in the absence of clienteles. As described in Section 2,
11this means that each period sellers simultaneously announce a price in the set
{pH,p L}, buyers get to observe the list of announced prices and the identity of
the seller behind each price and can freely choose whom to trade with. Hence,
if both prices are called on by sellers, those who announce pL split the entire
market equally among them, while those announcing pH sell no units. In this
situation, competition is quite ﬁerce since each seller, by undercutting, can steal
immediately its competitors’ market share.
We will explore this model, as well as its counterpart with clienteles in the
next section, under two extreme information structures: one in which all sellers
are informed regarding the true state of the world and the other where only one
of them is informed.
4.1. All Informed Oligopolists
As in the case of monopoly, state H sellers will always charge pH and, as soon as
the price pL is in the list of announced prices, all buyers remaining in the market
will always buy at this price. If, on the other hand, all sellers announced pH in
the ﬁrst t periods, the buyers’ choice at t depends on their belief αt that the state
of the world is H.L e t qB(t) denote then the probability that a buyer accepts,
at t, if all sellers propose pH, given histories where all sellers oﬀered pH in the
past. The formal deﬁnition of the strategies of buyers and sellers - and hence of
an equilibrium - is otherwise the same as in the previous section (we denote by
qS(t) the probability that each state L seller charges pH in period t); similarly, αt
is the buyers’ belief at t that the state is H if all sellers proposed pH at t and in
each prior period.11
The non-exclusivity of the sellers’ information, as well as the limits on their
market power given by the presence of various sellers competing among them, im-
pose severe constraints on their ability to hide their information and manipulate
buyers’ beliefs as in the case of monopoly. To hide the information would in fact
require to repeatedly announce a high price even when the state is L. However,
doing so now would give other sellers a strong incentive to undercut. Even though
by undercutting the seller would reveal its information, the beneﬁts from expand-
ing its market share would be higher the larger is the number n of sellers; hence,
for n suﬃciently large they will outweigh the costs of revealing the information.
11Again we can restrict our attention, without loss of generality, to symmetric equilibria.
The puriﬁcation argument outlined above (in footnote 10) continues to apply to the buyers.
Moreover, by the simple structure of the model, one can show that there are no asymmetric
equilibria among sellers. Hence the notation qS(t) just presented.
12We proceed to characterize the equilibria of the model in this case. Due to
the non-exclusivity of the information that each seller holds, there is always an
equilibrium where all the information is immediately revealed: each seller in period
1 announces pH in state H and pL in state L with probability 1, while buyers always
accept both pL and pH (if all sellers oﬀered pH). When the number of sellers n
is small enough, we can also have ’collusive’ equilibria, where sellers behave as in
the equilibrium with monopoly obtained in the previous section, or where they
randomize in state L for the ﬁrst T periods and then always propose pL. However,
as n grows, all these ’collusive’ strategies cease to be part of equilibria, and there
is no other equilibrium than full and immediate information revelation. Formally,
Proposition 2. In the model with n informed sellers without clienteles:
(i) Full and immediate information revelation: for any n  2,t h e r ea l w a y s
exists an equilibrium where qS(1) = 0 and qB(1) = 1.
(ii) For n small enough, the following equilibria also exist:
(ii.a) No revelation or partial immediate revelation: all sellers (and
hence buyers) behave as in the monopoly equilibrium.
(ii.b) Full revelation but with delay: qS(t) ∈ (0,1) and qB(t) ∈ (0,1) for
1 ≤ t<T,and qS(t)=0 ,q B(t)=1for t ≥ T).
(iii) Asymptotically, full and immediate revelation in all equilibria:f o r
n suﬃciently large all the equilibria in (ii) vanish and the unique equilibrium is
the one described in (i).
4.2. One Informed Oligopolist
We explore now a diﬀerent information structure, in which there is only one in-
formed seller, whose identity is commonly known and whose information is then
exclusive.12 As a consequence, the informed seller has the same ability as the
monopolist to hide his information. However, to be able to proﬁt from this in
the presence of other (uninformed) sellers, the informed seller must be able to
successfully manipulate both the buyers’ and the other sellers’ beliefs to induce
a l lo ft h e mt ot r a d ea tah i g hp r i c e ,a n dt h i sm a yn o ta l w a y sb ep o s s i b l e ,a sw ew i l l
see. This is not optimal, when the number of sellers in the market is suﬃciently
12If the identity of the informed seller were not known, the inferences of the uninformed traders
from the observation of the proposals made would be more diﬃcult; however, one can show that
the validity of our results extends to that case, due to the strong (resp. weak) undercutting
incentives in the absence (presence) of clienteles.
13large: in that case in fact the incentives to undercut and steal all his competitors’
market share prove too strong, even though by so doing all information would be
revealed.
More speciﬁcally, for n small, we have equilibria where no information is re-
vealed (and there may even be no equilibrium with full revelation): the informed
seller hides his information, partially or completely, and with some positive prob-
ability trade takes place at pH in both states. However, for n suﬃciently large,
the equilibrium is unique and reveals immediately the information to the buyers,
as in the case where all sellers are equally informed.
Combining the results of both subsections it becomes apparent that the large
number of sellers competing in the market under the absence of clienteles, but not
the diﬀerences in the information structure, seems to be the key feature to allow
information to be fully and immediately revealed to the consumers.
To characterize the equilibria formally, we need now to describe separately
both the strategy of the informed seller, in states H and L, and the uninformed
sellers (and buyers). As before, the informed seller in state H will always charge
pH.W ed e n o t et h e nb yqI(t) and qU(t) the probability that the state L informed
seller and each uninformed seller, respectively, charge pH at date t.L e tqB(t) be
the probability that buyers accept pH in period t, following a history where the
only price announced by sellers has been pH.
S o m ef u r t h e rn o t a t i o ni sa l s on e e d e dt oi d e n t i f yt h er e l e v a n tc u t o ﬀv a l u e si n
the beliefs of uninformed sellers. Let:
 α be the belief that makes uninformed sellers indiﬀerent between trading at pL
and not trading at all:  α(pL − cH)+( 1−  α)(pL − cL)=0 . Thus for α< α
an uninformed seller strictly prefers trade at pL to no trade.
ˆ α be the belief that makes uninformed sellers indiﬀerent between not trading
at all and announcing pL, when every other uninformed seller proposes pH
while the informed state L seller proposes pL: ˆ α(pL−cH)+(1−ˆ α)
pL−cL
2 =0 .
For α>ˆ α no uninformed seller would oﬀer pL in this situation.
It can be easily veriﬁed that  α>ˆ α.
Proposition 3. In the model with n sellers, only one of whom is informed, with-
out clienteles:
(i) For n large enough, there is always an equilibrium with full and immediate
14information revelation. Speciﬁcally,
(i.a) Full information revelation to all uninformed traders:f o rl a r g e
enough n and for all α0  ˆ α, there exists an equilibrium where qU(1) = 1, qI(1) = 0
and qB(1) = 1 (that is, at t =1the uninformed sellers charge pH, the informed
seller charges pH in state H and pL in state L, and buyers accept both pL and pH,
provided all sellers oﬀered pH).
(i.b) Full information revelation to buyers: for large enough n and for all
α0 <  α, there exists an equilibrium where qU(1) = qI(1) = qB(1) = 0 (at t =1
the uninformed sellers charge pL, the informed seller charges pH in state H and
pL in state L, and buyers accept only pL at t =1 ).
(ii) No full revelation:f o rn suﬃciently small there are equilibria where qI(t),q U(t) ∈
(0,1] and qB(t) ∈ (0,1] for all t ≤ T, for some ﬁnite T ≥ 1.
(iii) Asymptotically, full and immediate revelation in all equilibria:a s
n →∞ , the only equilibria are the ones in (i).
The uninformed sellers’ behavior also depends on their beliefs about the state.
However, as in the monopoly section, in the situation considered here there is still
no need to specify oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs after unilateral deviations (of the
informed seller). The inference both of buyers and uninformed sellers is in fact
irrelevant when the informed seller (or, for that matter, any seller) announces pL
since the optimal response of buyers is always to accept in this case and hence the
game ends immediately. On the other hand, there is no oﬀ-equilibrium deviation
to pH.13
In this model information is monopolized by one seller. However, Proposition
3 makes it clear that, as n grows large, the intensity of price competition among
sellers in the model with no clienteles gives too strong an incentive to undercut
and hence all information is revealed to the buyers right away. The equilibrium
in (i.b), that also survives for all n, is characterized by the fact that all infor-
mation is immediately revealed to the buyers, but there is no revelation to the
uninformed sellers, who end up trading at pL in state H. Their prior belief giving
low probability to the state being high leads them to bear a payoﬀ in that state
that is not ex post individually rational.
13With regard to deviations by uninformed sellers, when n>2 there will always be at least
one uninformed oﬀering pL, thus leading to an immediate termination of the game.
155. Oligopoly with Clienteles
We analyze here to what extent the results obtained in the previous section (in
particular, the fact that all information, whether exclusive or not, is immediately
revealed to the buyers when there are suﬃciently many sellers) remain valid when
less extreme forms of price competition are considered. To this end, as anticipated
in Section 2, we introduce the model with clienteles, whose main diﬀerence from
the previous one is that each period a buyer can only buy from his designated
seller; hence the term clientele. This association only lasts one period, as each
time t the buyers remaining in the market are randomly reassigned to sellers. By
undercutting, each seller can now steal only a limited fraction of his competitors’
market share.
Again we proceed to study the model when there are n sellers under the two
extreme information structures.
5.1. All Informed Oligopolists
If all other informed sellers choose pL, i.e., to reveal their information, and this
is commonly observed by all buyers, the best reply of a seller is clearly to do the
same, as long as there is some, even very weak, competition among sellers. Thus
full and immediate revelation of the information remains an equilibrium in the
model with clienteles, because of the non-exclusivity of information.
On the other hand, as already mentioned, the gains from undercutting are now
much more limited. To see this more precisely, consider the situation where, at
some date t in state L all sellers announce pH. We can construct now diﬀerent
equilibria supporting this outcome using diﬀerent oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs when one
seller deviates to pL. I ft h e s eb e l i e f sa r et h a tt h es t a t ei sL with probability 1,
buyers will reject all oﬀers of pH. Thus only the seller who announced pL will
sell to the 1/n − th of the market constituting his clientele for the period. The
remaining (n−1)/n−th o ft h eb u y e r so nt h em a r k e ta tt will then still be around
at t+1and will be equally split among the n sellers. At t+1all sellers will oﬀer pL
if the buyers’ strategy is to keep rejecting all oﬀers of pH. Thus by undercutting,




of the market; moreover, his increase in market share will take one period to
materialize. As a consequence, collusive behavior among sellers, and in particular
to hide the information and proﬁtably manipulate buyers’ beliefs, is now easier.
This shows that if the collusive payoﬀ in state L, (pH − cL), is tempting enough,
the ”local monopoly” power created by the presence of clienteles suﬃces for the
16existence of another (collusive) equilibrium regardless of the number of sellers:
each seller behaves as in the monopoly equi l i b r i u ma n dn oi n f o r m a t i o n ,o ro n l y
the minimal amount necessary to trade at the high price, is revealed. Furthermore,
with other oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs, there is a collusive equilibrium that does not
necessitate the assumption of the collusive payoﬀ being large enough. We give its
d e t a i l si np a r t( i i )o ft h en e x tp r o p o s i t i o n .
This stands in clear contrast with our ﬁndings for the model without cliente-
les. It reveals that, even in the absence of exclusivity of information, no revelation
may occur at equilibrium, whatever the number of sellers, when the intensity of
competition among sellers is not too strong. It also shows that the nature of com-
petition among sellers appears to play a more important role than the exclusivity
of information in determining whether or not information is fully revealed to the
buyers, when there are many sellers.
Formally, we have:14
Proposition 4. In the model with n informed sellers with clienteles:
(i) Full and immediate information revelation:f o ra l ln ≥ 2 and all α0 there
is always an equilibrium where qS(1) = 0 and buyers accept pH in period 1 when
all prices announced in that period are pH.
ii) For any n ≥ 2, the following collusive equilibria (where sellers behave as in the
case of monopoly) also exist:
(ii.a) No revelation:w h e nα0  ¯ α, qS(t)=1for all t and buyers immediately
accept pH;
(ii.b) Partial revelation:w h e nα0 < ¯ α and
pH − cL  (pL − cL)[δ +
(1 − α0)¯ α
α0(1 − ¯ α)
],
qS(1) ∈ (0,1) so that α1 ≥ ¯ α and buyers accept with probability 1 if all sellers
announce pH; for t>1 we have qS(t)=1and all buyers accept pH.
5.2. One Informed Oligopolist
As we saw in the previous subsection, in the presence of clienteles hiding the
information can be proﬁtable for an informed seller, whatever the number of sell-
ers (this is true in particular when the proﬁts per unit sold at a high price are
14We use here again qS(t) to denote the probability that a seller proposes pH in state L at
date t.
17suﬃciently higher than the proﬁts from a sale at a low price). However, with non-
exclusive information a fully revealing equilibrium always exists, together with
collusive equilibria, for any n. When there is only one informed seller, infor-
mation is exclusive and the informed seller can always hide it, as in the case of
monopoly. We should expect then that in this situation full revelation is diﬃcult
to achieve. Indeed, we will show that, for many parameter conﬁgurations, separa-
tion is impossible at equilibrium and an equilibrium exists where at least part of
the information is never revealed. The only case in which hiding the information
can prove too costly for the informed sell e ri sw h e nb o t ht h eg a i ni nt h ep e ru n i t
proﬁt obtained by selling at pH in state L is suﬃciently low and the prior belief of
the uninformed sellers suﬃciently optimistic so that they may be willing to oﬀer
a low price.
T h er e s u l t sa r ea g a i ni nc l e a rc o n t r a s tw i t hw h a tw ef o u n di nt h em o d e lw i t h o u t
clienteles. If information is exclusive, we should not expect it to be revealed at
equilibrium, when the intensity of the competition among sellers is not too strong.
Proposition 5. In the model with n sellers, only one of whom is informed, and
with clienteles:
(i.a) Full revelation is impossible for many parameter conﬁgurations:f o r
any n ≥ 2,i fpH −cL > (pL −cL)(1+δ) (the collusive payoﬀ is not too small), or
α0 < (pL − cL)/(cH − cL) for all t (beliefs are suﬃciently pessimistic), at equilib-
rium we have qI(t) > 0 for all t;
(i.b) Full revelation only occurs for some parameter values: there exists n
large enough such that, for pH−cL < (pL−cL)(1+δ) and α0 > (pL − cL)/(cH − cL),
there is an equilibrium with qI(1) = 0.
(ii) For any n ≥ 2, the following additional equilibria exist:
(ii.a) No revelation:w h e n α0 ≥ ¯ α, qU(t)=qI(t)=1for all t (both the
uninformed sellers and the informed seller in both states charge pH) and buyers
immediately accept;
(ii.b) Partial revelation:w h e nα0 < ¯ α and (pH − cL) > (pL − cL)(1 + δ),
qI(1) ∈ (0,1) and qU(1) = 1 (the informed seller randomizes in state L in the initial
period, while the uninformed charge pH); for all t>1 we have qI(t)=qU(t)=1 .
In every period, buyers randomize between accepting and rejecting when all an-
nounced prices are pH.
Thus, for a large subset of the parameter region full separation never occurs
and only collusive equilibria exist, whatever the number of sellers n.F o r t h e
18complementary region, separation can be supported, but collusive equilibria are
also found. Thus, the message of the model with clienteles is somewhere between
the information revelation ﬁndings -and hence convergence to fully revealing REE
- of the model without clienteles, where competition is quite intense, and the non-
revelation results of the pairwise meetings literature, where the local monopoly
p o w e ro fe a c hs e l l e ri ne v e r ym e e t i n gi sr einforced by the lack of observability of
public signals that could help reveal the information.
6. Welfare Analysis
We discuss here the welfare properties of the equilibria we obtained. As known
from the literature on REE, equilibria with full and immediate information reve-
lation are ex post Pareto eﬃcient. In our set-up, where all traders are risk neutral,
such equilibria are also interim eﬃcient, and characterized by no delay in trading.15
An important issue is then whether a result of lack of information revelation
implies simply a transfer of welfare from the uninformed to the informed agents or
rather, whether it is an instance of ineﬃciencies, manifesting themselves for exam-
ple with delay in trading. In evaluating such eﬃciency properties we should take
into account the fact that information is private, and hence require improvements
to satisfy incentive compatibility conditions (i.e., evaluate allocations according to
the notion of interim incentive eﬃciency). As shown in Serrano and Yosha (1996)
and Blouin and Serrano (2001), information revelation was always accompanied
by eﬃciency in the pairwise meetings models, while no-revelation caused interim
ineﬃciencies due to delay in learning. The same conclusion (i.e., that revelation
obtains if and only if there are negligible welfare losses) does not emerge in the
present paper. For brevity, we will simply state the results and not provide the
details of the arguments, which are available upon request.
6.1. Monopoly
(i) The equilibria with perfect pooling and immediate acceptance by the buyers,
obtained when α0 ≥ ¯ α, are clearly interim eﬃcient: all gains from trade are
exhausted, with no delay.
15Interim eﬃciency refers to the case where agents’ welfare is evaluated conditionally on their
information at the initial date, prior to the opening of markets.
19(ii) On the other hand, the equilibria with delay (obtained when α0 ≤ ¯ α) are
always interim incentive ineﬃcient.
Thus, the equilibrium with no information revelation in (i) translates in a
welfare transfer to the informed monopolist (with respect to the case of full in-
formation revelation), without entailing any welfare loss. On the other hand, the
partial revelation of the information occurring at the equilibrium in (ii) creates de-
lay and imposes a net loss in total welfare. We can show in fact that an (incentive
compatible) improvement can be found in this case if buyers’ behavior is kept the
same as at this equilibrium, while the seller charges pL with probability 1 in state
L: such mechanism leaves the welfare of the two types of the seller unchanged
(with respect to the equilibrium outcome), but strictly improves buyers, and is
incentive compatible. Moreover, such ineﬃciency persists even with arbitrarily
small discounting, when we let δ → 1, so that the cost of delaying trade by any
ﬁnite number of periods become vanishingly small: this is due to the fact that, as
δ approaches 1, a signiﬁcant fraction of trades takes place with longer and longer,
possibly inﬁnite, delay.
Although the comparison among the equilibrium payoﬀs of buyers and sellers
in the equilibria of type (i) and (ii) (without and with delay) involves agents in
diﬀerent economies, characterized by diﬀerent values of the prior belief α0,i ti s
worth noting that both types of the seller have a strictly lower payoﬀ in the second
equilibrium than in the ﬁrst. Thus, information revelation comes at a cost to the
seller.
6.2. Oligopoly without Clienteles
When all sellers are informed we found that the only equilibrium that survives for
any number of sellers n is the one with full and immediate information revelation
which, as we argued, is not only ex post but also interim Pareto eﬃcient. When
compared to the pooling equilibrium obtained under monopoly, the sum of the
payoﬀs of sellers in state L is now lower while buyers’ payoﬀs are higher. This
transfer to buyers is the cost to the sellers of information revelation, but unlike the
monopolist case, information revelation here does not destroy society’s welfare.
When only one seller is informed, two types of equilibria exist for all n.B o t h
are separating equilibria and the information, privately held by the only informed
seller, is fully revealed to the buyers.
(i) In the equilibrium described in part (i.a) of Proposition 3, the informed
seller in state H shares the market with the uninformed sellers, while in
20state L he manages to appropriate the entire market. Each buyer continues
to receive the same expected payoﬀ as when all sellers are informed. This
equilibrium is also interim eﬃcient and the total payoﬀ of sellers and buyers
is the same as with all sellers informed. The only diﬀerence one should stress
is the transfer of surplus from the uninformed sellers to the informed seller
in state L. Again, information revelation is achieved without any welfare
loss.
(ii) While the equilibrium described in part (i.b) of Proposition 3 is also interim
eﬃcient because of the absence of delay in trading, its features are somewhat
distinct. In this equilibrium the more optimistic beliefs of the uninformed
traders crowd out the informed seller in state H, who sells nothing. The
informed seller in state L now shares the market with the uninformed sellers,
who on the other hand sell in both states. Buyers are of course the clear
winners, paying a low price in both states and avoiding delays. Recall that
even though this equilibrium is interim eﬃcient, information is not revealed
to the uninformed sellers: all trade occurs at pL in state H so that unin-
formed sellers, driven by their optimistic beliefs, end up transacting at a
price that is not ex post individually rational (in H).
6.3. Oligopoly with Clienteles
With regard to the case of all informed sellers, one possible equilibrium outcome
(Proposition 4, part (i)) is again full and immediate information revelation, as in
P r o p o s i t i o n2 .T h eo t h e r ,c o l l u s i v ee q u i l i b r i ao b t a i n e di nP r o p o s i t i o n4a r ev e r y
close to the ones found in Proposition 1 for the case of the monopolist. The reader
is referred to the previous subsections for discussions of their welfare properties.
Consider next the equilibria with only one informed seller. When separation
is sustained in equilibrium all trade takes place at pL in state L and at pH in
state H. The welfare properties of this equilibrium are similar to the ones of the
separating equilibrium described in (ia) of Proposition 3, with two diﬀerences: (i)
there is delay, though this should now be viewed as a trade friction generated by
the presence of clienteles; (ii) the distribution between uninformed and informed
sellers of their proﬁts in state L is now more equal.
In contrast, at the equilibria where the informed hides his information, the
total payoﬀ of buyers and sellers is the same as at the equilibria obtained under
monopoly. In some of these equilibria, delay occurs due to the buyers’ random-
ization and this causes ineﬃciencies. Note also that the expected payoﬀ for the
21informed and uninformed sellers is the same in this case (unlike in the equilibria
of the model without clienteles); thus the existence of clienteles exerts a positive
externality on the uninformed sellers and, clearly a negative externality on buyers,
who pay the high price in both states.
7. Related Literature
As mentioned in the introduction, other papers examine the strategic foundations
of REE, considering some speciﬁc trading mechanisms. Dubey, Geanakoplos and
Shubik (1987) and more recently Forges and Minelli (1997) study the case where
trading takes place via market games a la Shapley and Shubik (1977), in the pres-
ence of a continuum of agents of ﬁnitely many types. Each source of information
is possessed by a continuum of agents. They show that, when the trading game
is repeated, the Nash equilibria are such that the ﬁrst stage is used to exchange
information among traders (equilibrium prices act as public signals), and in the
subsequent stages the outcome coincides, under appropriate conditions, with the
fully revealing REE. The case of a market game where strategy sets are demand
functions is analyzed by Kyle (1989) with ﬁnitely-many informed traders: he
shows the existence of equilibria where only part of the information is revealed
and studies how the amount of information revelation varies with the share of
informed traders relative to both uninformed and noise traders.
In a static auction context, Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) and Perry and
Reny (2003) study conditions under which sequences of symmetric equilibria ag-
gregate information and converge to REE. Closer to our work, Peters and Sev-
erinov (2002) study the issue in a sequential auction context, in which traders’
observations of the actions of others allow them to make inferences about the true
state.
The case in which there is a single informed trader acting strategically is con-
sidered by Grinblatt and Ross (1985), L a ﬀ o n ta n dM a s k i n( 1 9 9 0 )w i t h i nao n e -
period model, and by Kyle (1985) in a dynamic setting. In both cases it was shown
that the monopolist may choose not to completely reveal his private information
and that equilibria diﬀer from REE. To understand the diﬀerences with respect
to our results, in particular in the case of Kyle’s work, note that he considers a
model with noise traders, where prices are determined each period by competitive
market-makers on the basis of the observation of aggregate trades. Thus, aggre-
gate trades, and a fortiori prices, cannot fully reveal the private information of
the informed trader. Even if he were to act non strategically, full revelation could
22only be achieved in the limit, after inﬁnitely many rounds of trade. Since he acts
strategically, convergence of prices to their full information value is slower since
the informed agent is able to “hide” his trades from the market. Our result for
t h em o n o p o l i s tc a s ei sd i ﬀ e r e n t ,b e c a u s ec o ntinued randomization, whereby infor-
mation is progressively revealed over time, is never optimal, due to discounting
and the absence of noise traders.
Information revelation is also addressed in models of dynamic trading with
more than a single informed trader by various papers extending the analysis of
Kyle (1985). Vives (1995) examines a situation with a large number of risk averse
informed traders acting myopically, ﬁnding that convergence is rather fast (see
however Medrano and Vives (2001), where the addition of a large strategic agent
to the set-up of Vives (1995) limits information revelation). Several informed
traders are introduced in the dynamic trading model of Kyle (1985) by Holden
and Subrahmanyan (1992); they show, via numerical simulations of the model,
that strategic agents compete aggressively by sending very large trade orders,
thereby neutralizing the eﬀect of noise t r a d e r sa n dl e a d i n gt oq u i c kr e v e l a t i o n
(in line with our ﬁndings for the case in which all sellers are informed). Such
results however no longer hold if the signals received by informed traders are
only imperfectly correlated, as shown by Foster and Viswanathan (1996) (also via
numerical simulations); again there ares o m ea n a l o g i e sw i t hour ﬁndings for the
case of only one informed seller, in the model without clienteles.
The diﬃculties met in establishing the convergence of the equilibria of strate-
gic models to competitive outcomes with asymmetric information over common
value uncertainty should be contrasted with the case of complete information, or
even of asymmetric information of the private values type. In these cases perfect
competition arises as a fairly robust limit of game theoretic models when the num-
ber of traders increases (see, e.g., Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994),
Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) and Cripps and Swinkels (2004) in a double
auction context). Note that this occurs even in models of random matching and
pairwise meetings (see Gale (1987), Serrano (2002), Shneyerov and Satterthwaite
(2003)). We should also point out that in a dynamic set-up market power may
vanish even in the case of monopoly: the Coase conjecture for a durable goods
monopolist, uninformed about the demand curve he faces, shows in fact that
monopoly pricing, under reasonable assumptions, converges to the competitive
price as the frequency of trades increases (see, for example, Gul, Sonnenschein
and Wilson (1986)).
F i n a l l y ,e v e nt h o u g hf o r m a l l yo u r si sn o tar e p e a t e dg a m e ,w es h o u l da l s o
23mention the relationship between our work (particularly in the case of a single
informed seller) and the literature on two-player repeated games with incomplete
information, where partial revelation results in which information is revealed in
the ﬁrst stages are also obtained. See Forges (1992), Zamir (1992), Mertens, Sorin
and Zamir (1994) and references therein.
Appendix A: Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs of our results.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
The proof proceeds by establishing ﬁrst some properties of the equilibria:
A) Full and immediate information revelation never occurs (in ﬁnite time); at
no date the seller in state L proposes pL with probability 1. Formally:
Lemma 1. At any equilibrium, qS(t) > 0 for every t.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : Suppose not: there exists a period t such that qS(t)=0 .
Since, if the state is H, the seller proposes pH for certain, it follows that there
is full separation at t. Thus we have αt =1 . Upon observing pH at t the buyers
can infer the state is H for certain and so their optimal strategy must always
be to accept pH with probability 1 at date t (qB(t)=1 ). But then the optimal
strategy of the seller in state L at t would be to propose pH rather than pL, a
contradiction.
B) If at some t the buyers’ strategy is to accept pH for sure, then in that
period the type L seller will propose pH for certain. This in turn implies, when
the buyers’ belief αt is suﬃciently close to 1, that at each earlier date the buyers
should also prefer to accept pH for sure; hence the seller must prefer to propose
pH for certain. Hence we have:
Lemma 2. If, at an equilibrium, qB(t)=1for some t,t h e nw em u s ta l s oh a v e
qS(t)=1 . If, in addition, αt > ¯ α we obtain that, for every t  <t , qB(t )=qS(t )=
1.
24Proof of Lemma 2: This is easily established by backwards induction. If in period
t, qB(t)=1 , the seller’s best response in that period is clearly qS(t)=1 .S i n c e
qS(t)=1 ,α t−1 = αt; thus, if αt > ¯ α the buyers’ payoﬀ from accepting at t − 1
is positive and strictly higher than the payoﬀ from accepting at t,f o ra l lδ<1.
The buyers’ best response in period t − 1 must then be qB(t − 1) = 1. Iterating
t h ea r g u m e n t ,w eﬁ n dt h a tt h es a m em u s tb et r u ea ta l lp r e v i o u sd a t e st  <t .
C) If in equilibrium buyers randomize for inﬁnitely many periods, their belief
αt must jump to a suﬃciently high level at the initial date and stay constant at
that level forever after:
Lemma 3. If, at every date t, qB(t) ∈ (0,1), then we must have αt =¯ α for all t.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :Note that the evolution of posterior beliefs αt is determined
from Bayes’ rule using the seller’s strategy and, accordingly, follows equation
(3.1). As we already noticed, this sequence of posterior beliefs is non-decreasing
in t. In addition, to sustain the buyers’ randomization in every period, we need
the following condition to hold at all t:16
αtuH +( 1− αt)uL − pH = δ[(1 − αt)(1 − qS(t +1 ) ) ( uL − pL)+
+(1 − (1 − αt)(1 − qS(t + 1)))(αt+1uH +( 1− αt+1)uL − pH)] (7.1)
where on the left hand side we have the payoﬀ from accepting pH and, on the
right hand side, the payoﬀ from rejecting it at t a n da c c e p t i n gi ta tt +1 .
Because by hypothesis, the randomization involves inﬁnitely many periods,
the inﬁnite sequence of posteriors {αt}, which is monotone and bounded, has a
limit. We will show that limt→∞ αt =¯ α.
Suppose 1 > limt→∞αt > ¯ α; in this case, by equation (3.1), limt→∞ qS(t)=1 .
But if we consider (7.1) and take the limit as t →∞ , plugging limt→∞qS(t)=1in
and using the fact that limt→∞(αt −αt+1)=0 , we reach a contradiction, because
for δ<1 the term on the right hand side of (7.1) will be strictly lower than the
one on the left hand side, so buyers strictly prefer to accept.
Similarly, if limt→∞ αt =1:the term on the left of (7.1) tends to uH − pH
while the term on the right tends to δ(uH−pH), which is strictly lower, thus again
we get a contradiction.
16The same arguments apply if the randomization does not involve two consecutive periods.
The right hand side of (7.1) is then more involved, but the essence of the argument is identical.
25It remains then to show that we cannot have limt→∞ αt < ¯ α either. But this is
immediate, since the expected payoﬀ from accepting a pH oﬀer, pH −αtuH +(1−
αt)uL, is negative whenever αt < ¯ α. T h u sb u y e r sw o u l db eb e t t e ro ﬀb yr e f u s i n g
to trade altogether at t, instead of randomizing between accepting and rejecting.
Finally, note that, in order to sustain the randomization of the buyers at any
date t, it must be αt  ¯ α. This fact, together with the property limt→∞ αt =¯ α
established above, implies that inﬁnite randomization of the buyers requires αt =
¯ α for all t.
We are now ready to establish the claim of the Proposition. By Lemma 1,
pure strategies where qS(t)=0for some t can never be part of an equilibrium.
Consider then the only other possible pure strategy of the type L seller, qS(t)=1
for all t.
If α0 ≥ ¯ α, a best reply for the buyers to this strategy is qB(t)=1for all t:t h e i r
expected payoﬀ is in fact non-negative and any other strategy would only induce
delay and still result in either no trade or trade at the same price, pH, yielding
so a lower (weakly if α0 =¯ α) payoﬀ. The strategy qS(t)=1for all t is then also
the seller’s best reply to qB(t)=1for all t since the payoﬀ obtained by the type
L seller is pH − cL, the highest possible. This establishes that qB(t)=qS(t)=1
for all t is an equilibrium if α0 ≥ ¯ α, as claimed in part (i) of the statement of the
proposition.
On the other hand, if α0 < ¯ α, the buyers’ best reply to qS(t)=1for all t is
qB(t)=0for all t; but then the seller’s best reply is qS(t)=0for all t, so that we
do not have a pure strategy equilibrium in this case.
Consider next the candidate equilibria where buyers randomize for inﬁnitely
many periods. From Lemma 3, such equilibria require the seller to - possibly -
randomize at the initial date, so as to induce the posterior belief α1 =¯ α,a n dt o
propose pH with probability 1 at all later dates t>1. This is clearly possible only
if α0 ≤ ¯ α (hence, when α0 > ¯ α these equilibria never exist).
L e tu sd e n o t eb yVL(t) the present value, at t, of the discounted expected
ﬂow of payoﬀs of the type L seller, given that he always proposed pH in the past
(including the current period t), and got always rejected; VL(t) satisﬁes then the
following:
VL(t)=qB(t)(pH − cL)+δ(1 − qB(t))VL(t +1 ) (7.2)
Any sequence of values qB(t) ∈ (0,1) satisfying the conditions:
26pL − cL = qB(1)(pH − cL)+δ(1 − qB(1))VL(2) (7.3)
pL − cL ≤ qB(t)(pH − cL)+δ(1 − qB(t))VL(t +1 )for all t>1
supports the strategy qS(1) ∈ (0,1),q S(t)=1for all t>1 as the seller’s best
response to {qB(t)}t. It is immediate to verify that we can always ﬁnd some, in
fact many, sequences with this property. Furthermore, since αt =¯ α for all t  1,
any sequence of values qB(t) ∈ (0,1) is a best reply for the buyers. Thus, as
stated in part (ii) of the statement of the proposition, such equilibria always exist
if α0 < ¯ α. By a similar argument, any sequence of values qB(t) ∈ (0,1) satisfying
the inequality in the second equation of (7.3) for all t ≥ 1 and the seller’s strategy
qS(t)=1for all t ≥ 1 are a best response to each other (and hence constitute an
equilibrium) when α0 =¯ α.
To complete the proof of the Proposition, it remains to consider the possibility
of an equilibrium where buyers randomize for a positive but ﬁnite number of
periods.17 Suppose that there is an equilibrium where qB(t)=0for all t greater
or equal than some date T  2. Then the seller’s best response, as we already
argued, would be qS(t)=0for all t  T, w h i c hb yL e m m a1c a n n o tb ep a r to fa n
equilibrium.
On the other hand, if qB(t)=1for all t  T  2 is part of an equilibrium
strategy, we must have αT  ¯ α. If αT > ¯ α we reach again a contradiction, by
Lemma 2. If αT =¯ α and αt < ¯ α for t<T ,we must have qS(T) ∈ (0,1); for this
choice of the seller to be optimal we need, from (7.3), taking into account that
qB(T)=1 , the following equality to hold, pL −cL = pH −cL, which is impossible.
We are then left with the case where αT =¯ α and, for some ¯ t<T ,α t =¯ α for
¯ t<t<T,so that qS(t)=1for all t>¯ t, qS(¯ t) ∈ (0,1). Note ﬁrst that this can only
be part of an equilibrium if ¯ t =1and hence αt =¯ α for all t ≥ 1.18 The conditions
for the optimality of the seller’s strategy are again given by (7.3), where VL(2) is
deﬁned recursively by (7.2) together with the equality VL(T − 1) = pH − cL.I t
is easy to check that, for any δ<1 we can ﬁnd T, suﬃciently high, such that
these conditions are satisﬁed for some sequence {qB(t)}t≥1 exhibiting the property
qB(t)=1for all t  T. T h ec l o s e ri sδ to 1, t h el a r g e ri st h em i n i m a ln u m b e ro f
periods of randomization T required.
17It is immediate to see that we can only have an equilibrium where buyers never randomize
if the seller also never randomizes, the case already considered at the beginning of the proof.
18If ¯ t>1, so that αt < ¯ α and hence qB(t)=0for t<¯ t, from the inequality in the second
equation of (7.3) we obtain pL−cL ≤ δVL(t+1) for t<¯ t. But this is impossible since qS(¯ t) ∈ (0,1)
implies that VL(¯ t)=pL − cL.
27We conclude that, when α0 ≤ ¯ α, there exist equilibria where buyers randomize
both for an inﬁnite and a ﬁnite number T of periods, with T larger the closer is δ to
1. On the other hand, if α0 > ¯ α, there are no equilibria where buyers randomize.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Claim (i) follows immediately from the non-exclusivity of each seller’s infor-
mation. Eﬀectively, if a seller anticipates that his competitors oﬀer price pL in
state L (i.e. choose to fully reveal their information), the unique best response for
him is to do the same. The alternative is in fact losing entirely his market share.
Consider next the seller’s strategy in the monopoly equilibrium (ii.a). The best
possible deviation for a seller, when every other seller follows this strategy, is to
announce pL at a node where the strategy prescribes to oﬀer pH with probability
1. If the seller undercuts and oﬀers pL, he sells to the whole market at the price pL,
so that his proﬁts (starting from that node) are pL − cL. On the other hand, the
proﬁts obtained by adhering to the collusive strategy are
pH−cL
n (i.e. the seller’s
share of the monopoly proﬁts).19 Hence, the choice of the monopoly strategy for
all sellers remains optimal if and only if
pH−cL
n ≥ pL − cL, which holds for small
enough n; this proves claim (ii.a).
Turning to (ii.b), the optimality of the prescribed strategy for sellers require
them to be indiﬀerent, in each of the ﬁrst T periods, between oﬀering pH or pL.












where on the left hand side is the payoﬀ from oﬀering pH (at T), on the right hand
side the payoﬀ from pL and R(T) denotes the expected payoﬀ to charging pL in
the event that some of the competitors also charge pL.S i n c eR(T) ≥ 0,w h e nn is
suﬃciently large (7.4) cannot hold, no matter what are qS(T),q B(T) ∈ [0,1],t h u s
showing that even this strategy cannot be part of an equilibrium. On the other
hand, for n small (but greater than 2) w em a yb ea b l et oﬁ n dqS(t),q B(t) ∈ [0,1]
satisfying (7.4) and the analogous equalities for t =1 ,..,T −1, thus showing that
temporary collusion may be an equilibrium in that case.
To complete the proof of the Proposition, we have to show that no other
equilibrium exists. Claims (i) and (ii.a) characterize the equilibria where sellers
follow pure strategies or randomize for ﬁnitely many periods and switch then to
19Strictly speaking, in the special case where α0 =¯ α the proﬁts are less or equal this level.
28pH; claim (ii.b) describes the possible equilibria where sellers randomize for ﬁnitely
many periods and then switch to pL. It remains to consider the case where sellers
in state L randomize for inﬁnitely many periods. By a similar argument to the
monopoly case we can show:
Lemma 4. There is no equilibrium where the sellers in state L randomize for
inﬁnitely many periods.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :Note that for sellers to randomize at any period t (0 <q S(t) <
1), buyers have to accept pH with positive probability: qB(t) > 0. Moreover, for
the game not to end with probability 1 in ﬁnite time, it must be qB(t) < 1 for all t,
i.e. buyers have also to randomize for inﬁni t e l ym a n yp e r i o d s .R e c a l lt h e nL e m m a
3: this result is still valid and implies that limt→∞ αt =¯ α. But, if sellers randomize
during inﬁnitely-many periods, the sequence {αt}t1 is strictly increasing so that,
for any t,w eh a v eαt < ¯ α, which contradicts the fact that qB(t) > 0.
This completes the proof of the Proposition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
(i.a) Given the strategies for the other players described in the statement of
(i.a), when α0  ˆ α the expected proﬁt for an uninformed seller from oﬀering pL is
non-positive. Hence in this situation an optimal choice for any uninformed seller
is indeed to oﬀer pH, which yields a positive expected proﬁt, 1
n(pH − cH)α0. The
informed seller in state L then strictly prefers to charge price pL if:




always satisﬁed for n suﬃciently high.
(i.b) When the other uninformed sellers, as well as the informed one in state








If α0 < ˜ α this inequality is always satisﬁed for n large enough. It is then immediate
to see that the informed seller’s choice of oﬀering pL (in state L)i sa no p t i m a l
response to the uninformed’s strategy, since
pL−cL
n ≥ 0.
29(ii) Let n be suﬃciently small so that pL−cL ≤ 1
n(pH−cL). Note that pL−cL ≥
(pL − cH)α0 +( 1− α0)(pL − cL) for all α0; the unit expected payoﬀ of trading at
pL is always higher for the informed than for the uninformed seller since the ﬁrst
one can choose to trade at this price only in state L.
First, we have equilibria that resemble the ones found in the monopoly section.
That is, if α0 ≥ ¯ α, oﬀering pH every period both for the uninformed sellers and
the informed seller in the H and L states constitutes an equilibrium.20
In addition, there are equilibria that involve randomization on the part of the
informed seller in state L for T>1 periods: in period T +1, the informed seller in
state L must charge pL (this low price in the ﬁnal trading date is needed to sustain
the randomization of buyers, which in turn is required for the informed seller to
be willing to randomize). In the ﬁrst T periods, in some of these equilibria the
uninformed sellers charge pH while in others they randomize between pH and pL;
in period T +1they will charge pL (if αT+1 <  α ) or randomize.
(iii) We show ﬁnally that as n →∞the only equilibria are those with full and
immediate separation described in (i). Evidently, there is no equilibrium where
the informed seller in state L charges pH with probability 1 (as the ﬁrst of the
equilibria described in (ii)): with n large undercutting is always preferred. By an
argument similar to the one in the proof of Lemma 4, sellers cannot randomize for
inﬁnite periods. We are left then with examining the other equilibria described
in (ii), where the type L seller randomizes for T periods before choosing pL with
probability 1.
Suppose ﬁrst that the uninformed sellers choose pH at T +1. Then, the indif-
ference condition for the informed seller in period T between pL and pH is:
q
n−1













n qB(T)+δ(pL − cL)].
For n suﬃciently large, the term on the right hand side is approximately q
n−1
U (T)δ(pL−
cL). This is smaller than the ﬁrst term on the left hand side because δ<1,a n d
in addition, the rest of terms on the left hand side are not negligible. Thus, the
expression on the left hand side exceeds the one on the right hand side, which is
a contradiction.
The same is true, a fortiori, if the uninformed choose pL with positive proba-
bility at T +1. So we conclude that these also cease to be equilibria for n large.
20If, on the other hand α0 < ¯ α, there is an equilibrium where the informed seller in state L
randomizes in the initial period to induce the belief α1 =¯ α.
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
( i )W eo m i tt h i sp r o o f ,a si ti ss i m i l a rt ot h a to fc l a i m( i )o fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
(ii.a) When the strategy of the buyers is to accept pH if all sellers propose pH,
and that of all the other sellers is to propose pH in state L at date 1, the proﬁt
f o ras e l l e ri fh ed o e st h es a m e( o ﬀ e rpH) is
pH−cL
n . On the other hand, if he were
to undercut and charge pL, he would sell immediately to the 1
n share of buyers
constituting his clientele at t =1 . Assigning oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs after
this deviation equal to the beliefs on the equilibrium path and assuming that the
sellers’ strategy is still to oﬀer pH at any later date (i.e., the same equilibrium
behavior as in period 1), buyers will continue to accept all oﬀers of pH at t =1 .
The payoﬀ for undercutting is then only
pL−cL
n , so that charging pH is clearly the
sellers’ best response.21 Given the sellers’ strategy, since α0  ¯ α,a l lb u y e r st h e n
prefer to immediately accept both pL and pH.
(ii.b) Taking as given the strategies of the buyers and the other sellers as
described in part (ii.b) of the statement, the payoﬀ to a seller in period 1 in the




if he charges pH, and
pL − cL
n
+ δ(pL − cL)
n − 1 − r
n2 (7.6)
if he charges pL. The probability of this event is then (qS(1))
n−1−r (1−qS(1))r (n−1)!
(r!(n−1−r)!).
On the other hand, if r =0sellers other than him charge pL,h i sp a y o ﬀi s
pH − cL
n
if he charges pH,
pL − cL
n
+ δ(pL − cL)
n − 1
n2
if he charges pL and the probability of this event is (qS(1))
n−1 .
To sustain indiﬀerence, we need that the expected payoﬀ of pH equals the
expected payoﬀ of pL, i.e. that the sum of the above terms describing the payoﬀ
21On the other hand, when the oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs following a deviation to pL are
such that the probability of L is 1 (as discussed earlier, in the second paragraph of section 5.1),
the same conclusion holds under the condition pH − cL  (pL − cL)(1 + δ).
31associated to pH, weighted by their respective probabilities, over all r running
b e t w e e n0a n dn − 1, equals the sum of the corresponding terms describing the






























n−1 =0 . (7.7)
Next, let ¯ qS be the value of qS(1) that generates an updated belief of the




α0(1 − ¯ α)
(1 − α0)¯ α
.
Observe that qS(1) can be set to take any value between ¯ qS and 0, thus inducing
ab e l i e fα1 ≥ ¯ α, and hence supporting the buyers’ choice to immediately accept
both pH and pL. When qS(1) = 0, the term on the left hand side of (7.7) is clearly
negative. On the other hand, when qS(1) is such that qS(1) = ¯ qS, the sign of this
term is equal to the sign of:
(pH − cL)

α0(1 − ¯ α)
(1 − α0)¯ α
(n−1)/n





α0(1 − ¯ α)
(1 − α0)¯ α
(n−1)/n
δ] (7.8)
which is positive, for all n, under the condition in the statement of part (ii.b).22
Therefore, it is always possible to ﬁnd a value of qS(1) ∈ [0, ¯ qS] so that (7.7) is
satisﬁed.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
(i.a) Suppose full separation occurs in equilibrium in some period t. Then, the
state H informed seller charges pH in that period, and the state L informed seller












is the reciprocal of a probability, and hence










so that the condition in the statement
of (ii.b) can be used in the above inequality to get the result.
32charges pL. By Bayes’ rule, the buyers and the uninformed sellers must update
their beliefs at t to αt =1 , upon observing the informed seller charging pH, and
to αt =0upon observing the informed seller charging pL.I fpL is observed, the
clientele of the informed seller must clearly accept. But so must the clientele of
t h ei n f o r m e ds e l l e ri fh ec h a r g e spH, because the only reason to reject would be to
expect pL in the future. However, the low price in the future could only come from
the uninformed sellers, who believe now that the state is H with probability 1,
and hence will never charge the low price. Therefore, the clientele of the informed
seller must accept both pH and pL. It follows that in state H all units are sold in
period t because all buyers accept even pH. When all the uninformed announce
pL (which may only occur when α0 ≤ αt < (pL − cL)/(cH − cL)), the informed
seller’s proﬁts from announcing pL in state L are then
pL−cL
n , always smaller than
the proﬁts from announcing pH, given by
pH−cL
n . On the other hand, when all the
uninformed announce pH, the informed’s proﬁts from announcing pL in state L are
pL−cL
n +δ(pL−cL)n−1
n2 , again smaller than the proﬁts from announcing pH (
pH−cL
n )
under the conditions stated in (i.a). Thus, under those conditions the informed
seller in state L has an incentive to deviate and charge pH.
(i.b) The strategies supporting separation are as follows. The informed seller
charges pL in state L and pH in state H in every period. The uninformed sellers
also charge pH in period 1, but switch to pL if they observe the informed seller
charging pL. Buyers accept both prices if they observe the informed seller charging
pH. They accept only pL if they observe the informed seller charging pL.
The optimality of the buyers’ strategy easily follows from the degeneracy of
their beliefs (obtained by using Bayes’ rule at all information nodes where the
informed charge pH or pL, thus assigning oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs when only unin-
formed sellers deviate equal to the ones on the equilibrium path). Considering
next the informed seller in state L, given that the collusive payoﬀ is not too at-
tractive (the ﬁrst condition on the parameter values imposed in (i.b)), there exists
n large enough such that pL is a best response:
pL − cL
n






















α0(pH − pL) > (1 − α0)(pL − cL)(1 − δ/n).
33The validity of this condition is ensured by the assumption made on α0 in (i.b)
for large enough n.
(ii.a) We construct here an equilibrium where pH is announced by all sellers in
period 1. Therefore, the belief held by uninformed traders is equal to their prior
α0. Because α0 ≥ ¯ α, buyers are at a best response accepting pH. Furthermore,
we consider the case where the oﬀ-equilibrium belief, following a deviation to
pL in period 1,r e m a i n sα0; hence pH continues to be accepted by buyers. In
this situation, charging pH is clearly the best response for the informed seller in




n (because of the clientele friction, given the assigned oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs,
undercutting would only have the eﬀect of lowering revenues over the same market
share.)23
By essentially he same argument, charging pH is also a best response for any
uninformed seller. If he were to deviate to charging pL, the beliefs held by unin-
formed traders are unchanged and hence buyers continue to accept pH from all
the other sellers. Thus his expected proﬁts would be α0
pL−cH
n +( 1− α0)
pL−cL
n ,





(ii.b) Let qB be the probability with which buyers accept pH, in any period
t, when all prices announced (at t and any earlier date) are pH. By Bayes’ rule,
upon observing pL charged by the informed seller and pH by all uninformed, the
posterior belief is that the state is L with probability 1.
We begin by analyzing the incentives of the informed seller in state L.F o r











1 − δ(1 − qB)
] (7.9)
Under the condition we imposed that the collusion payoﬀ is attractive enough,
it is easy to see that, for ﬁxed δ and n, there exists a unique value of qB that
makes the equality hold. This will be the equilibrium value of qB.A ta n y l a t e r
date t>1 the payoﬀ from announcing pH and pL are again the same (when the
oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs, following a deviation to pL, are that the state is L with
probability 1); hence charging pH is (weakly) a best response.
Consider next the uninformed sellers. If one of them deviates to pL we assign
23As in Proposition 4, when the oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs following a deviation to pL are,
on the other hand, such that the probability of L is 1, a limited increase in the seller’s market
share is obtained if he undercuts . The deviation is again non proﬁtable under the condition
pH − cL  (pL − cL)(1 + δ).
34oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs equal to the ones on the equilibrium path. Clearly the
payoﬀ associated to this deviation is only positive provided pL >α 0cH +( 1−
α0)cL. In that case, if the strategy of all traders following this deviation prescribes
oﬀering pL, it is easily veriﬁed that the expected payoﬀ for deviating to pL is
pL−(α0cH+(1−α0)cL)
n [1 + δ n−1
n ]. This expression, taking into account (7.9), is strictly




1−δ(1−qB)].T h i s
shows that the deviation considered is unproﬁtable.
Note, ﬁnally, that the probability that the informed seller charges pH at t =1
is chosen so as to yield α1 =¯ α.T h u s ,b u y e r sa r ew i l ling to randomize at t =1
between accepting and rejecting upon the observation of all prices being pH.G i v e n
that pooling on pH takes place from period 2 on, buyers are best-responding by
continuing their randomization in any period t>1.
Appendix B: Robustness of Results
The results obtained on the characterization of the equilibria are robust to the
extension of the model along several dimensions. We will formally establish the
properties for the monopoly model and discuss then the extension to the oligopoly
case.
Continuum of prices:
The characterization of the equilibria was obtained under the simplifying as-
sumption that the seller can only propose one of two possible prices, pH and pL,
exogenously given. We show here that the main qualitative properties of equi-
libria, in particular with regard to their information and eﬃciency properties,
remain essentially the same when the seller is free to propose any price in a closed
interval, subset of (cL,u H). Thus, for the issues we have studied, our simplifying
assumption is without essential loss of generality.
a) We still have no equilibrium sequence with separation in ﬁnite time, i.e., the
seller charging diﬀerent prices at some t in H and L with probability 1.24
The result follows by a straightforwar de x t e n s i o no fL e m m a1i nA p p e n d i x
A. Suppose such an equilibrium existed. In state H the seller would oﬀer a
24This stands in contrast with the result in Laﬀont and Maskin (1990) who show that a
separating equilibrium always exists, in the setup of a one period trading model where the
uninformed’s demand is strictly decreasing in the price.
35price ¯ p ≥ cH (sales at any price below cH would in fact result in losses). If
buyers accept such price for sure, the seller in state L w o u l dp r e f e rt oa l s o
charge ¯ p, rather than the separating price, which is some price p less or equal
than uL, a contradiction. But there are no equilibria either where the high
price is always rejected with some positive probability: such randomization
on the part of buyers requires in fact, after period t (when information is
revealed), a decreasing sequence of prices in state H,w h i c ha ts o m ep o i n t
w o u l dh a v et of a l lb e l o wcH, again a contradiction.25
b) If the prior belief α0 is high enough, so that we can ﬁnd prices (typically an
interval I ⊆ [cH,u H))a tw h i c hb o t ht y p e so ft h es e l l e ra sw e l la sb u y e r s
are willing to trade, pooling equilibria with immediate trading again exist,
though now there is a continuum of them.
For any p ∈ I, t h e r ei si nf a c ta ne q u i l i b r i u mw h e r et h es e l l e rc h a r g e sp
both in state H and L and buyers accept; if the seller deviates to p   =
p, oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs are such that α1 =0 , thus buyers accept p  if
a n do n l yi fp  ≤ uL, which ensures that no proﬁtable deviation exists for
any type of seller. Having this continuum of equilibria, the complicated
issue of equilibrium coordination arises, which we avoid with our simplifying
assumption.
c) If α0 is small enough so that there is no price at which buyers and the seller
in both states are willing to trade, the seller’s strategy in state L needs to
be such that some information is revealed, as in the case considered before
with only two prices.
Therefore, equilibria are always characterized by the fact that the state L
seller randomizes in the initial period between two prices. The low price
is always given by uL. (To see this, note that following such a low price
announcement we have a complete information game between the state L
s e l l e ra n dt h eb u y e r s .I ns u c hag a m e ,uL is the only equilibrium price.) The
high price is some price above cH,t h a ti sa l s oc h a r g e dby the seller in state
H.26 Buyers randomize then between accepting and rejecting.
25Note that if uH were allowed as a possible price an equilibrium of this type would exist: set
¯ p = uH, p = uL,a n dqB(t) constant and low enough to deter deviations of the state L seller.
26It is possible that the seller randomizes in state H too (and the state L seller randomizes
over the low price and more than one level of the high price). The argument in the text easily
extends to this case.
36c1) We always have equilibria where, at all subsequent dates t>1, the state L
seller no longer randomizes and proposes the high price, while buyers keep
randomizing between accepting and rejecting.
Such equilibria have then the same features as the equilibrium with partial
information revelation we obtained in the previous section for the case of
low α0. Again there is a continuum of such equilibria, for the diﬀerent values
that the high price can take.
c2) There may be additional equilibria, where the seller (in state L) randomizes
for an arbitrary, possibly inﬁnite, number of periods.
At all equilibria where the state L seller randomizes for more than one period
(so that αt+1 >α t  ¯ α) buyers have to randomize and, by essentially the
s a m ea r g u m e n ta si nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a2 ,t h e yh a v et od oi ta ta l lp e r i o d s .
This will in turn be optimal provided the following condition holds:
αtuH+(1−αt)uL−pH(t)=δ(1−(1−αt)(1−qS(t+1)))(αt+1uH +( 1− αt+1)uL − pH(t +1 ) ),
(7.10)
where pH(t) denotes the price charged by the seller in state H with proba-
bility 1 a n di ns t a t eL with probability qS(t),w h i c hm a yn o wv a r yw i t ht.
Since the sequence of posterior beliefs {αt}t1 must converge and the prices
in state H, {pH(t)}t1 , cannot fall below cH,a st tends to inﬁnity, condition
( 7 . 1 0 )c a no n l yh o l di f ,f o rl a r g et,w eh a v e
αtuH +(1−αt)uL−pH(t) ∼ = αt+1uH +(1−αt+1)uL−pH(t+1)∼ = 0. (7.11)
Note that αtuH +( 1− αt)uL − pH(t)  0 for all t and (7.10) implies that
the sequence {αtuH +( 1− αt)uL − pH(t)}t is increasing; hence from (7.11)
we get:
αtuH +( 1− αt)uL − pH(t)=0for all t, (7.12)
i.e., buyers are always indiﬀerent between trading and not trading at pH(t),
as in the equilibrium with one period randomization we found above in c1).
Moreover, from (7.12) it follows that the price pH(t) proposed in state H
increases over time.
Thus we can have information being revealed now over many periods. However,
it is important to notice that, as shown below, at all such equilibria the payoﬀs
of buyers and the seller are either equal or lower to the ones obtained in the
equilibria where the seller in state L randomizes for only one period. The equilibria
37with more periods of information revelation (as in c2) are then interim Pareto
dominated by the equilibrium with only one period of randomization (as in c1).
More information revelation requires greater delays in trading and hence entails
a welfare loss.
Lemma 5. At all equilibria where the state L seller randomizes for more than
one period (as in c2), the payoﬀ of buyers and the state L seller is the same while
the payoﬀ of the state H seller is lower than in an equilibrium where the state L
seller randomizes for one period only (as in c1).
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . From the above description it is immediate to see that the
present value of the discounted expected ﬂow of payoﬀs at an equilibrium as in
c2) is uL − cL for the seller in state L and 0 for buyers (since, as we argued,
pL = uL), thus for both it is the same as in the equilibrium in c1). The payoﬀ
for the state H seller has then also the same expression as in such equilibrium









l=1 (1 − qB(l))

(cH − cL), though its value will
typically be diﬀerent (since buyers may randomize with diﬀerent probabilities):
in particular, we can show it will be lower. This follows from the fact that, as we
can see from (7.3), to sustain the state L seller’s randomization with an increasing
price sequence {pH(t)}t1 buyers have to reject with higher probabilities (qB(.) will
be lower) and these are the only variables determining the state H seller’s payoﬀ,
as we see from the previous expression.
Finite horizon:
All the equilibria we obtained for the case of inﬁnitely many trading dates
remain (or are approximated by) equilibria when there is only a ﬁnite number of
trading dates (T ≥ 1). This is clear when the equilibrium in question involves
a ﬁnite number of periods of trade; but even when there are inﬁnite periods of
trade, for example with inﬁnite randomization on the part of buyers, for any T
there is a payoﬀ equivalent equilibrium where buyers randomize at each trading
date.
To illustrate, consider the one-period (T =1 ) version of the model. In this
case, rejection of a price leads to “no trade”, thus to a zero payoﬀ. It is easy to
see that if α0 > ¯ α, the unique equilibrium continues to yield trade at pH in both
states. If α0 < ¯ α, the unique equilibrium prescribes that the seller in state L
randomizes between pH and pL so as to induce the belief α1 =¯ α, while the buyers
must accept the high price with probability qB(1) (where qB(1) is set at a level
such that the seller in L is exactly indiﬀerent between charging pL and pH).
38When T =2 , the equilibrium with α0 > ¯ α continues to have pooling on pH
and immediate trade, with no delay. When α0 < ¯ α,w i t hT =2we continue to
have as the unique equilibrium the one in which qS(1) is chosen to yield α1 =¯ α,
while qB(1) and qB(2) are chosen to make the seller in state L indiﬀerent between
charging pL and pH at t =1and to (weakly) prefer pH at t =2 ;the information
is then partially revealed only in period 1.
We can also show that no other equilibria exist, in particular there is no
equilibrium where both buyers and the seller in state L r a n d o m i z ea te a c ht r a d i n g
d a t e : i nt h a tc a s ei nf a c tw em u s th a v eαt > ¯ α for all t, thus buyers at the
terminal date accept pH for sure, and so the seller always proposes pH at T,b u t
then buyers cannot be indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting pH at T − 1.
We thus conclude that the qualitative properties of the set of equilibria are
essentially the same when T < ∞ and T = ∞, our ﬁndings are not generated by
a possible discontinuity at T = ∞.
Robustness of results in the oligopoly models:
The robustness analysis can build, to a large extent, on the properties derived
in this regard for the monopoly case. In particular, it is easy to see that the
full and immediate revelation result of the model without clienteles for n large
enough is again found with a continuum of possible prices, though now there will
be a continuum of such equilibria; also, for n large enough no collusive equilib-
ria exist. Analogously, the model with clienteles has equilibria with no or only
partial information revelation, whatever is n. Similar ﬁndings are obtained in the
corresponding ﬁnite horizon versions of these models.
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